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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

COTTON\VO()D MALL
CENTER, INC. ,

s HOPP IW;

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No.

14568

PUBLIC-SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTl\H, and FRANK S. WARNER
and OLOF E. ZUNDEL, Commissioners, and UTAH POWER AND
Lil,HT COMPANY,
Defendants.
REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF
The defendant, Public Service Commission of Utah, rested
its whole argument on the question of Res Judicata and that is
the principal basis of the arguments of defendant Utah Power
and Liqht Company.

The latter defendant also contends the Com-

mission correctly determined the plaintiff was not exempt from
regulation.

We address ourselves first to the matter of Res

Judicata.
Point I
THE D0CTRINE OF' RES JUDICATA DOES NOT APPLY IN THE COTTONWOOD
~11\LL

CASE BECAUSE:

1.

THE FACTS, THE IDENTITY OF THE SUBJECT MATTER AND THE
IDENTITY IN THE QUALITY OF PERSONS INVOLVED HAVE
CHANGED.
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2.

THE BURDEN IS ON THE PARTY ASSERTING RES JUDICl\T;
TO EST/\BLISH BY AFFIRMATIVE PROOF,

THAT THE CAIJSL

OF ACTIOll I!NOLVED AND Tf!E PARTIES ARE IDENTICAL THIS CASE.
3.

UNDER THE ERIE CASE THE STATE COURT SHOULD DECIITT
Hmv UTAH LAW APPLIES

4.

I;:J

UTAH.

IF RES ADJUDICATA IS TO APPLY,

A PERSON SHOULD NOC

BOUND BY A JUDGMENT UNLESS HE HAS HAD ADEQUATE OPP_
TUNI'l'Y TO LITIGATE MATTERS ADJUDICATED AGArnST HI::.
5.

THE LAW OF THE LAND HAS CHANGED SINCE THE FEDERAL
COURT RULED IN THE COTTONWOOD MALL CASE.

1.

MOST JURISDICTIONS

INDICATED THAT IN ORDER TO APPLY TITTE

JUDICATE DOCTRINE,

THERE MUST BE FOUR ELEMEHTS PRESENT:

a.

Identity of subject matter,

b.

Iden~i~

c.

Identity of persons and parties,

d.

Identity in the quality of persons for or against

af cause of action,

~~

the claim is made.
Cooper v Warnock, Wash., 134 P 2 706, 709
Smith v Gray, Nevada, 250 P 369
Pompanio v Larsen, Colorado, 251 P. 534
Paroutsis v Gregory, Penn., 35 A2 559

Res Judicata can apply only when the issues are identi
Emerson Estate v Cook, Ill., 50 NE 2 772
McCormick v Hartman, Mich., 10 NW 2 910
Klassen v Central Kansas Corp., Kans., 165 P 2 601,

GO

Res Judicata is not available where the issue in an
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'
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the same parties.
Cartev v Klein, New York, 24 NYS2 67 68
When it appears an issue was not determined bv judgment,
it is not Res judicata.
Stark v Coher, Calif., 129 p2 290, 393
Panos v Great Western, Calif., 126 p2 889, 895
In the case of West Jordon, Inc., 7 Utah 2d 391, 326 p2d1os,
1958, certain land owners obtained a judgment for severance from
the town by a District Court decree.

About two weeks later the

town passed an ordinance annexing the lands theretofore severed.
The landowner brought another action and the Honorable A. H. Ellett
dismissed the suit on grounds of Res Judicata.

The Supreme Court

reversed the lower court on the theory that the cause of action had
changed.
"Since the lands did not again become part of the
territory of the town until two weeks after the
severance in the prior action, their petition did
not involve the same cause of action even though
part of the subject matter was the same and the
same reasons were given for desiring the serverance."
"Since this action is based on a new and different
ordinance which necessarily requires the determination of essentially different facts from those
determined in the previous action that doctrine
can have no application to this case."
Obviously this case shows how liberal the Utah Courts are
on the matter of Res Judicata.

The Cottonwood Mall case has a

much stronger basis to show a change of facts and cause of action. In
the Cottonwood Mall case the facts have changed, the identity of the
subject matter has changed and the identity of the quality of per30n

has changed.

one of the principal pegs on which the Federal

-,-,urt hung its hat was the fact that Eldredge Furniture Company
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•
-4had purchased its store area and owned that one section of.
Cottonwood Mall.

The frict is that now, and at the time

a~c

cation was made to the Public Service Commission, Eldredge
Furniture had sold its space back to the Mall so the plain:.
owned all of the Cottonwood Mall property.
have changed.

Obviously the

The identity of the subject matter has

in that plaintiff now owns all the property.

1,

chan~

The identity•

the quality of person has changed in that the Federal court
found the Mall would be a utility and now it would not be a
utility.

We do not concede that the Federal Court made a

correct decision even in view of the Eldredge ownership, but
certainly this change is a material change sufficient to ta·.
the case outside of the bounds of Red Judicata and is suffk
to open tht= 'Tlatter for a decision of this court on its merit
or for a reversal to send back to the Public Service Commis·
sion to rule the plaintiff is exempt.
In the case of East Mill Creek Water Co. v Salt

La~

Utah 1945, 159 p2d 863, the court held:
"Where claim, demand or cause of action is different
in the two cases, then judgment in the earlier cases
is res judicata of the later only to extent that the
earlier judgment actually raised and decided the same
points and issues which are raised in the later case
This case followed numberous other Utah cases as foL
Everill v. Swan, 20 Utah 56, 57 P. 716. Glen Allen
Mining Co. v. Park Galena Mining Co., 77 Utah 362,
296 P. 231; Leone v. Zuniga, 84 Utah 417, 34 P. 2d
699; Logan City v. Utah Power & Light Co., 86 Utah
340, 16 P. 2d 1097, on rehearing, 86 Utah 354, 44
P. 2d 698; State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365 at paqe
422, 120 P 2d 285 at page 315.
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46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments §443 states:
"Clearly, the enforcement of the rule of res Judicata may not be avoided by the discovery of new
evidence bearing on a fact or issue invovled in
the original action, as distinguished from a subsequen~ fact or event which creates a new legal
situation, even though the newly discovered evidence might have been sufficient to justify a new
trial in the first case. However, where, after
the rendition of a jud9ment, subsequent events
occur, creating a new legal situation or altering
the ~egal rights or relations of the litigants, ·
the Judgment may therebv be precluded from operating
as an estoppel.
In such case, the earlier adjudication is not permitted to bar a new action to
vindicate rights subsequently ~red, even if the
same property is the subject matter of both actions."

The many footnote cases include California, Idaho and
Washington cases.
§443 goes on to say:
"In this connection, it has been declared that the
doctrine of res judicata extends only to facts and
conditions as they existed at the time the judgment was rendered, and that a judgment is not res
judicata as to rights which were not in existence
at the time of the rendition of the judgment.
It
has even been held that the effect of a judgment
as res judicata may be preduced by events creating
a new leoal situation occurring pendente lite before
the rendition of the judgment, where a supplemental
pleading is not filed."
§382 discussing merger of cause of action in Judgment
states:
"However the doctrine of merger of a cause of action
in the j~dgment rendered thereon is calculated ~o promote justice, and will be applied with.due c;:onsideration of the demands of justice and equity; it maf be"
carried no further than the ends of justice require.
Adam v Davies, Utah, 156 P 2 207
te>Ils us that

158 ALR 852.§383

this doctrine and the doctrine of Res Judicata

Sponsored by the S.J.
Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Restatement Judgments §54 states that where a judgw,,
is rendered for the defendant on the ground of the

nonexist~

of some fact essential to the plaintiff's cause of

action,~

plaintiff is not precluded

fro~

maintaining an action after

such fact has subsequently come into existence.
Even in the Knight case cited by both defendants, on4
part of the facts were considered as affected by Res

Judica~.

not the whole case.
In asserting that no facts were presented in evidence
at the argument before the Public Service Commission the defendants are admitting that they did not present any

eviden~

to show that the facts in this case are the same as the facts
in the case before the Federal Court.

The burden is

clear~

on the movina nri:-tv to prove circumstances are the same.
Parties asserting Res Judicata must establish, by
affirmative proof, that the cause of action involved
and parties are identical as in this case.
Mccann
v Iowa Mutual Liability Ins. 1 Nw2 682, 688
~-

NEITHER THE UTAH COURTS NOR OTHER COURTS HAVE STRICTLY
FOLLOWED THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA.

JUSTICE AND PUB·

LIC POLICY ARE TIIE COlnROLLING CONSIDERATIONS.
In the
P 2 1228

and

recent~~se

SS"t p2 /,2. 57 ,

of Tates, Inc v Little America, 535
this court first reversed the lo>'

courts judgment for defendant in favor of the plaintiff and
remanded the case back to the lower court.

The lower court

granted the defendant's motion for a new trial and religated
the same issues over the objections of the plaintiff.

On the

second appeal, this court upheld the lower court despite the
principle
of Res Judicata.
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46

Arn

Jur 2d, Judgments §402 states:

"The doctrine of res judicata may be said to adhere
in legal systems as the rule of justice. Hence, the
position has been taken that the doctrine of res
judicata is to be applied in particular situations
as fairness and justice require, and that it is not
to be applied so rigidly as to defeat the ends of
justice or so as to work as injustice.
The sound policy behind the doctrine is also to be
considered in applying the doctrine. . . Moreover,
there are exceptions to the doctrine as res judicata
based upon other important reasons of policy.
In
this respect it has been declared that res judicata,
as the embodiment of a public policy, must at times
be weighed against competing interests, and must,
on occasion, yield to other policies. The determination of the question concerning judicial reconsideration is said to require a compromise, in each
case of the two opposing policies, of the desirability and finality and the public interest in reaching t~e right result.
Underlying all discussion of the problem must be
the principle of fundamental fairness in the due
process sense.
It has accordingly been adjudged
that the public policy underlying the principle of
res judicata must be considered together with the
policy that a party shall not be deprived of a fair
adversary proceeding in which to present his case.
It has also been declared that a determination of
issues in an action between private parties cannot
bar a contest to vindicate the public interest."
3.

UNDER THE ERIE CASE, THE STATE COURT SHOULD DECIDE HOW UTAH
LAW APPLIES IN UTAH.
Justice Brandeis in the Erie v Tompkins case, 304 US

64 in overruling the Tysen case states:
"Except in matters governed by the Federal Cons~itu
tion or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied
in any case in the law of the State. And whether
the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a
decision is not a matter of federal concern."
ond the Justice goes on to say this rule of law is necessary
to

preserve, "the autonomy and independence of the states Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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independence in their legislative and independence in their
judicial departments."

This principle was followed by ,Just.

Frankfurter in the Guaranty Trust Co, v York case,

326 u .S.

j

The plaintiff contends the Federal Court did not folL
the law in Utah, instead it declared that no law had been mad:
on the subject.
ject.

We contend that the law was made on the sub-

We contend that the law was made on the subject as se

forth in our main brief pages 10 through 13 both by the
and the legislature.

cou~

The legislature made it clear that com-

panies like the plaintiff should not be regarded as

Utiliti~

but were exempt where distributuion is through "private property,

i.e., property not dedicated to public use, solely

for his own use or use of his tenants.

The reasoning

of counsel for the defendant is fallacious and unsound when
they argue

t~at

the legislation exception does not apply to

Mall because no Malls were in existence in 1917 when the
was enacted.

l~

That is like saying the U.S. Constitution does

not apply to the jet, rocket, calculator, T.V. and computera
we are in now because they didn't exist 200 years ago.

That

great constitution still rules our greatly advance civilizat:
with only a few admendments.

The exception doesn't have to

identify each case specifically wherein it applies; but, obv 1
the exception applies to all property "not dedicated to pubL
use".
THE UTAH COURT IS NOT FORECLOSED FROM NOW ANNOUNCING
THE LAW IN THIS MATTER.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-9In the case of Atkins v Schmutz Manufacturing co.,
372 Fed.

2

762, decided in 1967, involved a question of

whethPr a Kentucky one-year statute of limitation or a twoyear Virginia statute of limitation applies to a complaint
filed in a Kentucky Federal Court when the tart occurred in
Virginia.

The Federal Court had previously held in several

cases, following the Kentucky state courts rulings, that the
Virginia two-year statute would apply.

The plaintiff relied

on those federal and state court cases when it filed its complaint in 1963, after the one-year limitation had expired.
The Kentucky court suddenly specifically reversed itself and
"expressly overruled" its previous cases before this case was
concluded which required the Federal Court to reverse its previous decision in order to follow state law.

Obviously the

state court can reserve its position or clarify its position
and the Federal Court must follow the State Courts rulings.
The cases cited by defendant and particularly Ham v.
Holy Rosary Hospital are not in point.

The Ham

case in-

volved constitutional questions that, of course, involved federal law not state law.
4.

IF RES JUDICATA IS TO APPLY A PERSON SHOULD NOT BE BOUND
BY A JUDGMENT m~LESS HE HAS HAD ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO
LITIGATE MATTERS ADJUDICATED AGAINST HIM.
In the Federal Court the plaintiff did not have his

day in court and never had an opportunity to present evidence
since the Federal court on a motion to dismiss converted it to
a MoLion for Summary Judgment and ruled against the plaintiff.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-10Again before the Public Service Commission the defendant,
Utah Power & Light, moved for dismissal and it was granted
without taking any evidence or giving the plaintiff a chance
to be heard.

The case of Davis v. First National Bank of

Waco (Texas), 161

sw 2

467, holds that under Res Judicata a

person should not be bound by a judgment unless he has had
an adequate opportunity to litigate matters adjudicated again:
him.

In the North Dakota case, Knutson v Ekren, 5 c~w2 7 4, t;,,

court held the issues must be fully tried and litigated.
5.

THE LAW OF THE LAND HAS CHANGED SINCE THE FEDERAL COURT
RULING.
The Judge Ritter decree in the Cottonwood Mall case

was dated July 11, 1969, holding the shopping center would
not be a public utility.

The Lloyd v Tanner case cited and

quoted extens1.vely in our original brief was decided by the
United States Supreme Court in June, 197 2, reversing the lower
court and holding that the center was private property and
holding that the shopping center had not dedicated any part
of its property to public use even though roads through it
were public and even though it held the same kind of non busi·
ness functions that the Cottonwood Mall held.

This ruling in

effect overruled the former law of the land laid out in the
Logan valley decision.
We call to the courts attention a new U.S. Supreme~
case, Scott Hudgens v National Labor Relations Board, 47 L Ed
2d 196, decided March 3, 1976.

This case involved picketing

of a privately owned shopping center.

The shopping center

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tried to stop the picketing in the center.

The National Labor

Relations Board held against the center even in view of the
Lloyd case and the Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order.
The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeal's judgment
and held in favor of the shopping center using the Lloyd case
as the chief basis of its ruling.

The majority held that the

holding in the Lloyd case "amounted to a total rejection of the
holding and rational in the Logal valley decision".
ing center was private property.

The shopp-

What the Lloyd case and the

Hudgens cases means to the Cottonwood Mall case is that the
mall must be held to be private property and the fact that it
serves customers and the public both paying and non paying,
that its facilities are not converted to public facilities.
And the light and power provided whether to paying customers
or non paying customers, whether during regular business hours
or on off hours, the power is for its own use or its tenants use.
46 Am Jur 2d, Judgment §444
"It is particularly with respect to the doctrine
of collateral estoppel precluding the religation
of an issue adjudicated in the previous action on
a difference cause of action, that a change in the
law after the rendition of the judgment operates
to deny conclusiveness to the judgment.
The rules that a judgment may be denied a conclusive effect because there has been a change in
the law since its rendition has also been regarded
as applicable to a change in the law by intermediate judicial decision of either a state or a
federal court."
Point II
THE COTTONWOOD MALL ELECTRICAL PLANT IS EXEMPT FROM
PECULATION BY THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION·
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-12We have already presented argument on this matter in
our prior brief so we present only a few cases to further
rebut the defendant's allegations.
In the 1968 Massachusetts case, Re Frank Properties,
Inc. 72 PUR 3d 305, where applicant applied for an advisory
ruling on the question of whether a shop9ing center landlord
proposing to furnish tenants "total energy service" would he
subject to regulation.

After a well considered opinion, a

copy of which is attached, the Public Utilities Department
ruled that the landlord would not be a public utility.
ruling has stood in effect thereafter.

The

The case is signifi-

cant because the analyzed leading court cases dealing with
"total energy" from Pennsylvania (Drexellrook Associates

v

Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 1965, 212 A 2d 237),
from Wisconsin (Re City of Sun Prairie, 1965, 57 PUR 3d 525
and General Split Corp., 1962, 44 PUR 3d 334), from New Jerse.
(Freehold Water

&

Utility Co. v Silver Mobile Home Park, 1961

68 PUR 3d 523).
In the case Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company
where the Ohio Shopping Centers Asso. Intervened, 53 PUR 3d
234, 1964, held that the Ohio Public Utilities Co=ission hac
no jurisdiction over sales of electrical energy by the

Sho~:

Center and that the Shopping Center was not a public utilitY·
In Llano, Inc v Southern Union Gas Co., N.M. 1964, 391
P 2d 646, the court considered the case where Llano purchas~
natural gas for delivery and resale to one industrial cust~·
They quote from 73 CJS Public Utilities §2 and from 43 Arn .J.
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

571 Public Utilities and then

states:

-13-

"Applying these rules to the facts in the instant
case we think the conclusion is inescapable that
Llano at no time held itself out as engaged in
supplying natural gas "to or for the public," or
to any limited portion of the public which might
re~uire natural gas, to the extent of Llano's
capacity.
It is now legally committed to serve
but one private industry, and has held itself
out as willing to serve only such other private
industrial users as its selects, if and when
additional natural gas reserves are available
to it.
Nor do we find any evidence, in support
of the Co.mnission' s finding and/or conclusion,
that Llano has held and is holding itself as
ready, willing and able to provide natural gas
service to or for the public or any segment thereof."
We also attach a copy of the City of San Prairie case
(1967) and the Drexellrook case (1965).

Both of these cases in-

valved landlords of big apartment complexes.

The Public Util-

ities laws of each state are about the same as that in the state
of Utah "providing gas or electrity to or for the public".
The principal of Res Judicata does not apply in the
Cottonwood Mall case and clearly the mall operation is exempt
e

from regulation by the commission.
Wherefore, ve pray the Honorable Court reverse the ruling of the Public Service Commission finding the Cottonwood Mall
is exempt from regulation by the commission.
Respectfully submitted,

IC

I·

' rKei th E. Sohm

J\

T·
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-14Copies of the foregoing Reply were served upon

dPf",i··

dants by mailing first class to attorneys for defendants,

P 1 t.

ert Gordon, P. 0. Box 899 Salt Lake City, Utah 84110, and t 0
G. Blaine Davis, 236 State Capitol B0ilding., Salt Lake City,
Utah, 84114, dated this 3rd day of November, 1967.

/

/

Keith E. Sohm - - -
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Appendix

A

RE FRA~K PROPERTIES, INC.
}vfASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES

Re Frank Properties, Inc.
D.P.U. 15715
January 29, 1968

for advisory ru!ill!J on question whether shopA PPLICATION
ping center landlord proposing to furnish tenants total
ellergy service would be subject to regulation; r1t!i11g granted,
and proposed operation found not subject to regulation.
Public utilities, § 11 - Advisory ruling as to utility status - Landlord total energy
seTVlce.
1. Upon application for an advisory ruling on the question whether a shopping center landlord which proposes to furnish total energy service to its
tenants would be subject to utility regulation, the department of public
utilities would exercise its discretion to give such a ruling where the landlord proposed to make a substantial investment and where the total energy
concept was receiving wide attention at the time, p. 306.
Public utilities. § 23 - Regulation dependent upon sale of se1-::ice - Stalitte.
2. A Massachusetts statute which subjects to regulation "all . . . corporations which . . . operate works . . . for the manufacture and
sale or distribution and sale of gas . . . or of electricity" makes regulation dependent upon the e..'<istence of a sale, unlike statutes in other jurisdictions which make regulation dependent upon the public nature of the activity,
p. 307.
Public utilities, § 41 - Landlord "total energy" services to tenants.
3. A shopping center landlord is not a gas or electric company subject to
regulation under a statute subjecting to regulation "all . . . corporations
which . . . operate works . . . for the manufacture and sale or distribution and sale of gas . . . or of electricity" where the landlord,
using gas either directly or converting it, proposed to provide total energy
sen;ce-heating, electric current, domestic hot "·ater, and chilled water for
air conditioning-for "·hich each tenant initially will pay 35 cents per annum
per square foot as an additional component of the rental, and where the
landlord '"ill make meter readings of such service to tenants for two years,
on which to establish charges for the remainder of 10-year leases without
regard to the quantity of energy consumed by the tenants during such
pe~iod; the commission found that the arrangement was "rent inclusion,"
p. 308.

.

By the DEPARTMENT: On July 10,
1967, Frank Properties, Inc., a Delaware corporation engaged in the business of owning and oper:iting shopping
centers. having entered into leases
[20)

with tenants under which it proposes
to supply tenants with variou5 energy
requirements. commonly known as
"tot;:i1 energy" plan. file<l a request for
:111 a<hisory ruling. pursuant to § 8 of

305

72 PUR 3rl
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_\L\.;,S,\Clil~I: l ·1 ..; J1L1'.\!CJ \11.:\T Ul' i'UHLlC Vl!LITIE:::i

Chap 30:\ of the General Laws, "as
to the legality of the proposed plan in
the light of the regulations and statutes administered .
. " bv the
department of public utilities. if it conducted activities described herein.
Documents and written representations as to the operations of Frank
Properties, Inc., have been received
by the department. The Massachusetts Electric Company was given an
opportunity to be heard in this matter
and declined this opportunity.
[ 1] The promulgation of advisory
rulings is discretionary with the department. Since Frank Properties.
Inc., proposes to make a substantial
investment, the advisability of which
may depend in large part on the legal
effect of the proposed operation and
since the total energy concept is one
that is receiving wide attention, 1 the
department believes that this is an appropriate matter for an advisory ruling. It must be emphasized that the
ruling relates to the specific facts set
forth in this opinion, and any variation
from these facts in this or any other
case might require a different ruling.
In addition, it is important that the
issue we are ruling on be precisely defined. The request for the ruling states
the issue in terms of "legality" which
is too general. The arrangement
might or might not be legal for a company subject to Chap 164. There is a
threshold question, however; namely,
whether this arrangement would constitute Frank Properties, Inc., a "gas
company" or an "electric company"
under the provisions of §§ 1 and 2 of
Chap 164 of the General Laws. In
this opinion we address ourselves to

that question alone and we note no determination as to the propriety of this
arrangement for a company which is
subject to regulation under Chap 164.
Frank Properties, Inc., has entered
into leases with various tenants for a
shopping center in \Vorcester, :VIassachusetts. It will purchase gas from
the Worcester Gas Company and will
use the gas directly, or by converting
it, for all the energy requirements of
the tenants. Under its lease arrangement the landlord will supply heating
and chilling water for air conditioning
and heating, electric current, and domestic hot water. Each tenant will
pay 55 cents per annum, per square
ioot as an additional component of
this rental.
Each lease will be for a minimum
period of ten years. During the first
two years meters will be installed to
measure the tenant's consumption of
electricity, heating, cooling, and domestic hot water. The meters will be
read each month and the tenant will
he furnished a copy of the reading. At
the end of two years a new charge for
the services will be fixed, determined
on the basis of the following: (a)
Average cost of filters used, (b) meter
readings based on the unit cost for
electricity at the rate of .0131 cents
per kilowatt-hour, heating .0183 cents
per unit of 10,000 Btu. cooling .02i2
cents per unit of 10,000 Btu, domestic
hot water .12 5 cents per 100 gallons
exclusive of normal water charges.
The amount previously paid by the
tenant during the 2-ycar period will
be adjusted and the tenant will pay the
new fixed charge during the remainder
of the lease term without regard to the

I See, e g., address of Ernest W. Giboon,
Ne'~ England Public Utility Commissioners
Chairman, Public Service Board of Vermont, Conference, June 26-28, 1967.
72 PUR Jd
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11u;u1tity of energy he consumes dur- rnrnpa11ics tfJ sell tht' equipment be1:1g this period.
cause the consummation oi the trans[Z] Our determination is governed action would make the landlord a
in· the provisions oi ~~ I and 2 oi "p11liiic utility'' ior which a separate
l'liap 164, which delineate the entities a11tliorization of the co1111nissinn was
tl1at are sui.Jject to regulation Ly this rc<[uired. The Pennsylvania supreme
department and have the duties and court reversed. The applicaLle statute
oliligations oi public utilities (although defined a "public utility" as one iurthat term is not used in the chapter). nishing gas or electricity "to .
Section 1 determines which domestic the public," and, the court held, servcorporations are subject to Chap 164, ice limited to tenants only was not
:u1d is not therefore applicable to service to the "public."
Frank Properties, Inc.
Section 2,
Similarly, in Freehold \Vater &
however, contains substantially iden- Utility Co. v Silver ~Iobile Home
tical definitions applicable to foreign Park (NJ 196i) 68 PGR3d 523, a
corporations. The difference between mobile home park owner which supthe two sections is that foreign corpo- plied water to its tenants was held not
rations are not subject to certain types to be a public utility under a statute
oi regulation, principally control of which defined utility as a company
security issues.
which supplied water for "public use."
Section 2 provides that substantially Among the reasons cited by the comall the other regulatory provisions mission were the absence oi metering,
,hall apply to "all
corpora- the limitation oi service to tenants,
tions which
operate works anJ t!1e incidental nature of the operafor the manufacture and sale tion of the water supply as compared
or distribution and sale oi gas . . , to the main business of the trailer
or of electricity .
"
park.
Because of this special language
The Wisconsin Public Service Comdefining the jurisdiction of this de- mission dealt with a "total energy"
partment, decisions in other states re- arrangement in Re City of Sun Prairie
lating to similar arrangements between (\Vis 1965) 57 PUR3d 525, and held
l:tndlord and tenants are not appropri- that the landlord was not a "public
;i.te. In Dre..xelbrook Associates v utility" because the use of energy, bePennsylvania Pub. Utility Commis- ing limited to tenants was not being
sion (1965) 418 Pa 430, 60 PUR3d supplied to the "public," as provided
175, 212 A2d 237, the landlord pro- in the statute. It was pointed out that
rosed to acquire certain equipment there would be no submetering though
irom the electric and water company apparently no reliance was placed on
serving it. It would then buy gas, this fact. See also General Split Corp.
water, and electricity at certain meter- v P.&V. Atlas Industrial Center, Inc.
ing points and distribute the gas, wa- (Wis 1962) 44 PUR3d 334.
ter, and electricity to tenants who
It is the public nature of the activity
would be separately metered and which controls regulatory jurisdiction
charged by the landlord, The com- in these states. Whether gas or elecmission denied the application of the tricity is being sold is only incidentally
307
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relevant if at all. T!te cases arc tltcrcfore not rersmsive in construing our
statute which 111akes nn reference to
the "ru!Jlic." but 111akcs re;;u!ation
depend on the existence of :i "sale."
On the other hand, our decisions
( and those oi the supreme judicial
court) relating to "resale" of electricity, though not directly related to possible regulatory jurisdiction over
landlords, furnish useful clues as to
the meaning of our statute as applied
to total energy arrangements. In Re
Boston Edison Co. ( :Vfass 1953) 98
PUR NS 427, affd sub nom. Boston
Real Estate Board v Massachusetts
Dept. of Pub. Utilities ( 1956) 334
:Vfass 477, 15 PUR3d 47, 136 NE2d
243, we held that Boston Edison Company was justified in filing a tariff
under which no power would be sold
within the territory in which it sold
electricity to any person purchasing the
power for resale. By this tariff amendment the company brought an end to
the practice of landlords purchasing
power at wholesale rates and submetering it to their tenants. There
was no occasion to decide whether
such landlords were themselves subject to regulatior, but it is clear from
the language that this department and
the supreme judicial court considered
that the practice constituted a "resale."
Compare A. W. Perry, Inc. v Boston
Edison Co. (Mass 1947) 70 PUR NS
161; Re Boston Edison Co. (Mass
1949) D.P.U. 8228.
[3] If Frank Properties, Inc., proposed to meter the electricity or gas
consumed by each tenant and charge
on the basis of the meter reading, wc
would be constrained to hold that this
constituted a "sale" of gas or electricity, subjecting Frank Properties, Inc.,
72 PURJd

ing practice with respect to apartment
houses.
Accordingly, wc be! ieve that the arrangement described herein is rent inclusion as that tcr111 was used in

rcbulation under Chap 164. Re
Lr"'-cll (:\fass 1957) D.P.U. 11694.
T!tis is not such a case, however. The
charge which the landlord rroposes to
make cm·ers far more than the use of
electricity or gas. It includes, for example, heating and cooling. Although
the fuel cost may be a component to
his charge to the tenant, it cannot be
separately stated apart from the cost
of equipment and labor necessary to
provide the tenant with heat. The use
of meters describea herein does not
make the arrangement a sale oi gas or
electricity. At most, only the electricity portion of tlie charge could be
said to be directly measured. The use
of gas for heating and air conditioning
is only indirectly measured through
the measurement of heat.
The controlling fact is that over the
entire course of the lease the charge
will not be based on measured consumption, even of 'he electric portion
of the charge. BecaL1se the total energy
concept is new, it is difficult to estimate the portion of the rent that the
landlord must charge for heat, hot
water, air conditioning, and electricity.
The metering for the 2-year period
merely provides a basis for estimating
a fair rental of the premises. The situation is not sig 1ificantly different
from that of an apartment building
landlord who supplies heat and hot
water and electricity to the tenants
without metering. The difference is
that this landlord through the accumulated experience of apartment house
owners is able to estimate with reasonable certainty the ~ost to him of supplying these services over the long
run. The metering in this case provides for a new arrangement on the
same basis as exists for the long-standlo

308
D.l'.U. SSG2, and we rule that on
these facts the lam.llord Frank Properties, Inc., would not be a gas company
nr an electric company.
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SUN PRAIRIE

v

B

PUBLIC SERVICE CO:\IMISSION

WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT

City of Sun Prairie
v

Wisconsin Public Service Commission
Additional respondents: Lewis P. Brooks, Brooks Equipment
Leasing, Inc., and \Visconsin Gas Company
-

Wis 2d -. 154 N\V2d 360
N ovembcr 28, 1967

from judg1.11e11t affirming commission decision that
landlord providing services to tenants was not public
utility; affirmed. For commission decision, see ( 1965) 57

A

PPEAL

PUR3d 525
Statutes, § 11 - Judicial co11structio11.
1. A construction given to a statute by the court becomes a part thereof
unless the legislature subsequently amends the statute to effect a change,
p. 418.
Public «tilities, § 41 - Services by apartment complex to tenants.
2. A landlord of a large apartment complex furnishing heat, water, light,
and power to all tenants, but not serving any adjoining landowners or the
public generally, is not a public utility and therefore not subject to commission jurisdiction, p. 418.

Proceeding by plaintiff city of Sun
Prairie to review a declaratory ruling
of the Public Service Commission of
\Visconsin that the project of defendant Brooks Equipment Leasing, Inc.
(hereinafter "Brooks"), in furnishing
heat, power, light, and water to its
tenants in its multiple apartment complex does not bring Brooks within the
definition of a "public utility" as defined by § 196.01 ( 1), Statutes. Lewis
P. Brooks, its president, was also
joined as a party defendant. Because
Brooks was not a public utility, the
commi~sion detennined Brooks was
not within its jurisdiction and did
[ 27)

not require a certificate of convenience
and necessity.
The city of Sun Prairie, which is
a public utility operating under an indeterminate permit to furnish electric
heat, light, and power to the public
within its boundaries, made application to the commission for such declaratory ruling on July 23, 1964.
Brooks was then the owner of a 15acre parcel of land in the city of Sun
Prairie on which it proposed to construct a 240-unit apartment project
housed in 15 buildings that will house
up to 1,000 people. Heat, light, water,
and power will be supplied by Brooks

417

71 PUR 3d
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;ill tenants in tlte 11r«ject. :\' ;illtral
gas will be purchased by it to operate
c11c;i11cs \\'liich will drive iour electrical
generators with a total capacity oi
jQQ kw.
I l eat-rcco\'cry equipment
will utilize waste hc:it from the engines to furnish low-pressure steam
to heat :ind air condition all 240
apartment units. No water, electricity, or heat will be supplied to adjoining landowners or to the public
gcnerally. The rents paid by the tenants wil~ cover the expense of the
utility services, so that they will not
be separately billed for same. Brooks
will rent an apartment "to any responsible person" who is able to pay
the rent.
After the commission made its
declaratory ruling, the city of Sun
Prairie petitioned the commission for
:i rehearing. Upon the denial of such
petition, the city then instituted the
instant review proceeding in circuit
court.
By judgment entered February 13,
1967, the circuit court affirmed the
declaratory ruling of the commission,
and the city has appe:iled.
The Wisconsin Gas Company,
which sells gas to Brooks for use
in its project, appeared in the proceedings before the commission and in
the review before the circuit court, and
opposed the city'$ petition.
t•1

Lewis P. ~rooks and Brooks Equipnient I.cas1ng-. Tnc.; Foley, Sammond
& T.:irdner, Vernon A. Swanson and
~· ]. Lesselyoung, :.lilwaukee,' for
·".
respondent \Visconsin Gas Company.
CURRIE, Ch. J.:
[1, 2] The issue on this appeal is
whether the landlord of a large complex which furnishes heat, light, water.
and power to its tenants is a public
utility within the definition oi § 196.01
( 1), Stats, so as to be under the
jurisdiction of the public service commission. This statute defines a public
utility as follows:
"'Public utility' means and embraces every corporation, company,
individual, .
. town, village, <Jr
city that may own, operate, manage.
or control . . . any part of a pl:int
or equipment, within the state .
.
for the production, transmission, delivery, or furnishing vf heat, light,
water, or power either directly or indire1:tly to or for the public. . . ."
We deem Cawker v Meyer1 to be
determinative of the result. In that
case the landlord constructed a building in the city of Milwaukee to be
rented for stores, offices, and light
manufacturing purposes.
A steam
plant was installed therdn to generate
heat, electric light, and power to be
furnished to the tenants and occupants
of the building who desired such utility service. Since the landlord was
unable to dispose of all the heat and
electricity to his tenants, he entered
into contracts with three adjoining
property owners to furnlsh them heat
and power.
The Wisconsin Railroad Commis-

APPEARANCES: Petersen, Sutherland, Axley & Brynelson, Madison,
Wilmer E. Trodahl, City Attorney,
Sun Prairie, for appellant; Bronson
C. La Follette, Attorney General,
'William E. Torkelson and Oarence
B. Sorenson, Madison, for Public
Service Commission; Stafford, Rosen.
1 (1911) 147 Wis 320. 133 NW 157, 37
baum, Rieser & Hansen, Madison, for LRA NS 510.
71 PURJd
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sion, which had jurisdiction O\'er
public utilities at th:it time, contended
'.hat the bndlord was a "public utility" as delined in ~ li9irn-[, Stats
I now S 196.01 ( 1 ), Stats). The com111ission argued that the furnishing of
he:it, light, :ind power "to anyone else
than to one's self is furnishing it to
the public within the meaning of the
statute. " 2 This court stated:
It was not the furnishing
nf heat, light, or power to tenants, or,
incident:illy, to a few neighbors, th;it
the legislature sought to regulate, but
the furnishing oi those commodities to
the public; that is, to whoever might
require the same. Wisconsin Ri\'er
Tmprov. Co. v Pier (1908) 137 Wis
325, 118 NW 857, 21 LRA ~S 538.
The use to which the plant. e<Juipment.
or some portion thereof is put must
be for the public, in order to constitute it a public utility. But whether
or not the use is for the public does
not necessarily depend upon the number of consumers ; for there may be
nnly one. . . . On the other hand.
a landlord may furnish it to a hundred
tenants, or, incidentally, to a few
neighbors, without coming under the
letter or the intent of the law. In the
instant case, the purpose of the plant
was to serve the tenants of the owners,
a restricted class, standing in a cert;iin contract relatiun with them, and
not the public. . . .
". . . The tenants of a landlord
are not the public; neither arc a few
of his neighbors, or a few isolated
individuals with whom he may choose

to deal, though they arc a part of the
pulilic. The word 'public' must be
construed to mean more than a limited cbss <lefined bv the relation of
hndlord and tenant~ or 1"· nearness
oi location. as neighbors: ur more
than a few who, liy reason of any
peculiar relation to the owner of the
plant, can be served by him.
"
. [The statute] was not intended tn affect the rel:ition of landlmd and tenant, or to abridge the
right to contract with a few neighbors
for a strictly incidental purpose,
though relating to a service covered
by it." 3
Chapter 499, Laws oi 1907, which
provided for the regulation of public
utilities and contained the definition
oi "public utility" found in§ 1797m-1
(now ~ 106.01 (IL Stats) had J,ccnme
generally known as the Puhlic l'tilities Law.4 The commission to which
this regulation had been entrusted was
the then recently created \Visconsin
Railroad Commission. John Barnes
was the first chairman of this regulatnry comn11ss1on. It is nnteworthy
that when the Cawker case reached
the cnurt in 1911, Barnes was then
a member nf this tribunal and concurred in the decision.
The stat11tory definition of "public
utility" in § 179im-1 has not been
amenclctl in any relevant portion since
this cnurt's decision in Cawker, and
the ~ame definition may be found today in § 196.01 ( 1). Stats. This court
has long been committed to the principle that a construction given to a
stat11te hy the court becomes a part
thereof. unless the legislature sub-

t Sec Crow. Legislative Control of Public
Utilities in Wisconsin (1933) 18 ::\[arquette
LR 80,
71 PUR3d
419

'Id, 147 Wis at p. 324, 133 NW at r. 158.
s I<l. 147 Wis at rp. 324-326, 133 NW at
p. 158,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

WlSCONSI.\" SUPRDIE COURT
ser1uently amends rhe statute to effect
a change.'
The courts of California,6 :\Iissouri,7 Ohio, 8 and Pennsylvania' have
similarly held that a landlord who
furnishes utility senice to his tenants
is not a public utility within the definition thereof contained in the applicable state law. Appellant has been
unable to cite a sinble authority t'J
the contrary.
\Ve consider the Pennsylvania
court's recent decision in Drexelbrook Associates v Pennsylvania
Public Utility Commission 10 to be
highly significant in view oi appellant's argument that the rule announced in Cawker should not be
extended to a large apartment complex such as the instant one. Drexelbrook Associates is the owner of a
real-estate development known as
It is a garden-type
Drexelbrook.
apartment village with 90 buildings
containing 1.223 residential units, 9
retail stores, and a club with a

dining room, swimming pool, skatin"
rink, and tennis courts. The Penns,·~
vania supreme court held that the
tenants of a landlord, although many
in number. do not constitute '"the
public" within the meaning of Pennsylvania's Public Utility Law, but
constitute rather a defined, privileged,
and limited group. The court held
that the proposed service of electricity
to them thus would be private in
nature.
As in the instant appeal, it was
argued in the Drexelbrook Associates
case that regulation was desirable to
protect the interest of the tenants in
so large an apartment complex. In
disposing of this argument the Pennsylvania court stated :
"The controlling consideration is
not whether regulation is desirable.
but whether appellant [Drexelbrook
Associates] is subject to regulation
under the Public Utility Law."11
Judgment affirmed.

5 Moran v Quality Aluminum Casting Co.
( 1967) 34 Wis 2d 5-12. 556, 150 ~V2d 137;
:'.!ednis v Industrial Commission (1965) 27
Wis 2d 439. ~. 13-1 NW2d 416: Hahn v
'.Val"ort:i County (1961 ~ 1-1 Wis 2ct 147, 154,
109 NW2d 653. 94 :\LR2d 618: ~feyer v Industrial Commission ( 1961) 13 Wis 2d 377,
382, 103 :-.1\\"Zd 556: Thomas v Industrial
Commission (1943) 243 Wis 231, 240, IO
N\\"2d 206. 147 .-\LR 103: :'.!ilwaukee County
v City of ~lih,·aukee (1933) 210 Wis 336,
3-11. 246 :-;w 4-17; Eau Claire National Bank
v Benson (1900) 106 Wis 624, 627, 628, 82
NW 604.

e Story v Richardson (1921) 186 Cal 162,
198 Pac 1057, 18 ALR 750.
7 Missouri a
rel. and to use of Cirese v
".\fosouri Pub. Service Commission (1944)
-- Mu App -, 54 PL-:l NS 169, 178 SW2d
788.
•Jonas v Swetland Co. 119 Ohio St 12,
PIJRl928D 825, 162 NE 45.
• Drexelbrook Associates v Pennsylvania
Pub. Utility Commission (1965) 418 Pa 430,
60 PUR3cl 175, 212 A2d 237.
IO Su~ra. footnote 9.
11 Id. 418 Pa at pp. 441, 442, 60 PUR3d at
p. 181, 212 A2d at p. 242.

71 PUR Jd
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DREXELBROOK ASSOCIATES

v

C

P. U. C.

PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT

Drexelbrook Associates
v

Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission
.;

-

Pa -, 212 A2d 237
J unc 30, 1965

J\ PPE.AL from judgment affirming co111missio11 decision which

.1l..

d1soppro<:ed proposed sale mzd tra11sfer of utility facilities
to apartment complex; reversed and rema11ded with i11structio11s
to gra11t approval.
Public utilities, § 41 - Private ,-rir:e - Landlord ser.!i.~ to tenants.
1. An apartment comple.."< proposing to render service to its tenants only, and
at a profit, serves a defined, privileged, and limited group, and the proposed
sen-ice to them is private in nature and not a public utility service since it
would not be furnished "to or for the public," as provided by Public l:tility
Law, p. li3.
Consolidation, merger, and sale, § 35 - Grounds for appro~·al or disaPProval Loss of jurisdiction over service.
2. It was error for the commission to disallow the sale and transfer of
utility distribution and metering facilities to an apartment comple.."< on the
ground that the transfer would remove from commission supen·ision sen·ice
presently subject to its jurisdiction, for the commission did not have jurisdiction with respect to public policy in this matter since the service was not
rendered "to or for the public," as provided by the Public Utility Law; the
controlling consideration was not whether regulation was desirable but
whether the transferee of the facilities was subject to regulation under the
law, p. 180.
(CoHEl<, J~ with whom EAGEN, J., joins, dissents, p. 182.)

,.

APPEARANCES: Irving R. Segal,
Philadelphia, for appellant; Daniel F.
Joella, Harrisburg, for appellee.
Before Bell, CJ., and ~Iusmanno,
Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O'Brien, and
Roberts, JJ.
ROBERTS,.

J.;

[1] Applications to the public utilI The appro'l'al was sought under § 202(e)
of the Public Utility Law. Act oi ~lay 28,
1937, PL 1053, 66 PS § 1122(e), as amended

ity commission were filed by the Philadelphia Electric Company and the
Philadelphia Suburban Water Company seeking approYal of the transfer
by sale of certain equipment. 1 Commission approval would enable the
applicants to transfer distribution.
service-supply, and metering equipby Act of August 24, 1963, PL 1225, § 2, 66
PS ~ 1122 (Supp 1964).

175

60 PURJd
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mcnt to D,·cxe!Liroc•k Associates, a rcgi>'ered l:mited partnerslup 1vhich owns
acod mano.::;c~.a re::t~-~st:ite c~;\'tlopment
k::.:111':1 as
Drcxeiirook,
Drexclbrool-;, locJtcd in Drexel }I'll, Delaware COL!nty, is a garden-type ap:irtment vilbge with '-10 buildings, cont:iining 1,223 residential units, 9 retail
stores, v:irious public areas, and a club
\\'!th :i dining room, swimming pool,
s:;:iting rink, and tennis courts.
Tl:c equipment involved in the proposed tramfcr w::ls installed originally
L>y the applicants in the buildin;::s and
srorcs of the dc,·clopmcnt and is presently used by the applicants to furnish
g:is. \\':lter, and electric sen·ice dircctlv
to Drcxclbrook tenants. l.'.pon co;c1t1~inn uf tlic tran;fcrs. w:i.tcr service
W<Juld lie supplied by the water comp:my directly to DrcxLllirook Associates at inur metering points, and g-:is
and electric service would be supplied
l1y the electric company to Drcxclbrook
.\ssociates at :i single metering location.' Drexell1rook Associates would
purchase g:is, electricity, and w1ter
from the applicants at the proposed
metering points. In tum, it would assume the obligation and sole responsibility for furnishing :i.nd distributing
gas, electricity, :i.nd w:iter to its tenants
and for servicing and maintaining the
transferred facilities.
With respect to electricity and gas,
Drexelhrook Associ:ites assumes that
it would qualify for wholesale tariff
2 Presently, water service is supplied at 106
metering poi11ts, electric service is supplied at
1,335 metering locations, nnd gas service is
supplied at !,28J existing location•.
3 Although the commission itself seem• to
have assumed prcviou,ly that Drexelbrook
would qualify for the wholesale rate•, it now
questions for the first time in its brief before
this court whether Drexelbrook is so qualified. Even assuming the relevance of this

~PUR~

rates at such single metering points,3
and proposes to retain the transierred
meters in order to measure ead~ of its
tenant's individual consm'lptitJn. It
has agreed to bill each tenant on the
basis of such con.;nmption at the same
rate which the tenant would pay ii
he .received senice individually and directly from the electric company, thereby enabling it to make a profit. In
like manner, Drexelbrook :\ssociates
assumes that, with respect t0 11·:iter,
it wcul<l also qualify for the applicable
wl10lcs:ile tariff r:ites li:isccl on single
point w::iter metering service.• It proposes to continue to furnish \,·ater to
apartment tenants on the existing b:isis
by including the ch:irges for water
services within the rent. E1·idcntly,
rcmctering of w:iter at a prolit is contcmplalccl only with respect to the
swim club :tnd store tenants.
The commission dismissed the applicat;ons without he:iring on .\u~ust 19,
l<JG3. Drexclbrook Associates then
asked the commission to reopen the
matter and to grant it leaye to intervene and offer evid~nce in support of
the applications. The request was
gr:i.nted but after a subsequent hearing
the commission by a vote of 3-2, dismissed the applications on .Tune 8,
1964. Thereafter, Drexelbrook Associates appealed to the superior court&
which divided equally, thereby affirming the commission's order. A majority of the superior court then certified
factor in the present proceeding, we will not
now indulge in a fact-fincling process which
the corr.mission itself did not sec lit to undertake.
t Sec footnote 3, 111 pra.
& Neither the Philadelphia Electric Company
nor the Philadelphia Suburban Water Company, applicants before the commission, took
an appeal from the commission's determination.

l~
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to this cuurt ior considcr;ltion

.uid <iccision. 6

Jn d1,1n1"ing the applications, the
C<>J1n111,,1un he!J that upon consumrna: 1· >11 ui the proposed transiers oi the
,;,,,:;natcJ service anJ metering equipn1c:ll, app~llant would become subject
to ti1e provisions of the Public l:tility
L:iw. 7 For that reason, the commis,ion concluded that it would be necessary for :tppcllant to seek commission
:u1~l1urization to furnish the puulic
ut:iity services now rendered uy tlie
~~11piic;:ints.

The term "public utility" is dclincJ
in
2 of the Public Gtility Law as
including "persons or corporations
owning or opcracing in this
""n1111onwc:ilth equipment, or facilities
iur: (a) [ P Jroducing, generating,
tr:111smitting, distributing, or furnishi11:; 11;1tural or artificial gas, electricity,
to or for lite public for comrcnsation; ( b) [ d] iverting, develop111;, pumping, impounding, distributing, or furnishing water to or for the
f'11/J/ic for compensation
"8
(Emphasis supplied.) The question
rresented is whether the service which
appellant proposes to furnish to its
tenants would be service to or for the
f'1tblic within the meaning of the statute.

s

A number of decisions prove helpful in deciding the question in this
case.
In Borough of Ambridge v
Pennsylvania Pub. Service Commission, 108 Pa Super Ct 298, PUR1933
D 298, 165 At! 47, al!ocatur den 108
Pa Super Ct xxiii, where a manufacturer who furnished water to another

n1~u1ul~lcturcr \\'J.S iiclt.1 not to Le rendering a pctli!ic scn·ice, the court said
that ... [ t J he pub! ic or rri\ ate character
of the cntcrl'rise docs not dcpc:iJ . . .
upon tf:e number oi persons bv \\'horn
it is used, but uron \\'hether. or not
it is open to the use and service of all
members of the p11biic who may reqnire
it . . . .' " (Emphasis surplied.)
108 Pa Super Ct at p. 30+. PL"R1933
D at p 301, 165 At! at p. +9 ..\ronim'.nk Transp. Co. v Pc1111wh·ania Pnh.
Scn·ice C.m1mi-;sion ( 19.~+) 111 :'a
Super Ct +l+, 5 Pl'R ~S 219. 110
1\tl 315, was a c:ise where :i corporation O[Jerated arartment houses anJ
furnished bus transrortation to its tenants. :Ccc:iuse the corporation serYecl
only those who were sclcc·ted as tenants
- a special cbss of pcrsnns not open
to the indefinite public-the court hl'!cl
the service to lie pri\·atc in nature.•
The court concluded t:1at the service
rendered was merely incidental to t!1e
business of maintaining the apartment
house, and the fact that the tr:insportation was furnished to hundreds of
individuals residing in the 288 ;ip:irtments did not transform the private
nature of the service into a "public
service."
Overlook Develop. Co. v Pennsylvania Pub. Service Commission.
101 Pa Super Ct 217, PUR1931E 68,
affd per curi:un ( 1932) 306 Pa +3,
158 Atl 869, inrnlved a land development company which distributed \\':Jtcr
not only to vendees situated on its
previously owned tract of land, but
also to owners of adjacent land. The
court held the service was not open

I Act of ~Cay 28, 1937, PL IO~J. § 2(17)
(a) & (b), 66 PS § 1102(17) (a) & lb).
•The court cited with approval the quotation from Borough of Ambridge, 111~ro, in
text.
60PURJd
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e Sec Act of June 24, 1895, PL 212, § 10,
17 PS § 197.
•Act of May 28, 1937, PL 1053, §§ 1 et seq.
u amended. 66 PS §§ 1101 et seq.
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:'1c :n<lcfinite puulic but, be;ng con:incd to ;irivilc;cd indivi<lu;:lls, was pri'. :1tc in !1~t~1rc. Si;,:!li1ic:tntly. tlic crJ111n11":"11 •hc:t, in (;:1rnp \\'ul1clo v
~·(,, ·t~:ttc nf .St. IsJ:-tc Jug-ues ( 1Sl38),
JG l'J. l'L'C 377, adltcrcd to the doctrine expressed in Overlook, stating
t!1at "a public use .
. 'is not conlined to rrivileged individuals, but is
open to the indetinitc public' "and that
"'it is tl1is indefinite or unrestricted
quality that gives it its puliiic char.'.lc!cr.'" Pl,.R1031E at p. i3.)
tri

.\!though the present case involves
the O\\'ner of an apartment complex
wltich proposes to render service to its
tc11a11ts and to no one else, the commission held that the contemplated
sen ice would not be merely incidental
to the operation of Drexcl11rook, but
would be a separate and distinct enterprise ior profit, subject to the Public
Ctility Law. In part, the commission
based its conclusion on the fact that
appellant does not propose to reserve
the right to select its customers, but
would obligate itself under separate
and uniform contracts to furnish service to all tenants, present and future,
in it> development. The fallacy oi
this reasoning is shown in the dissenting opinion of the commission
chairman which stated that the test
"is not [whether] ;;.ll tenants
are being furnished [service,] but

whether anybody among the public
outside oi the Drexellirook group is
privileged to demand service." 10 In
the present case tlte only persons who
would be entitled to and who would
receive service arc those who have
entered into or will enter into a landlord-tenant relationship with appellant.
Here, as in Aronimink, those to be
serviced consist only of a special cbss
oi persons-those to be selected as
tenants-and not a class open to the
indefinite public. Such persons clearlv
constitute a clefincd, privileged, and
limited group and the proposed service
to them would be private in .iature. 11
The commission concedes that a
landlord would not be a public utility
if its charge for utility service is included, unitemized, in a flat rental.
The commission contends, however,
that appellant's intention to remetcr
the service, charge separately for it,
and make a profit presents a "aifferent
situation" and results in the proposed
service being public in nature. 12 However, it is apparent that whether or
not the utility charge is included in a
flat rental or determined through submetering, it still constitutes compensation to the landlord. We fail to see
how the method of computing the
charge for the utility service is in any
sense determinative of or rclt!vant to
the issue of whether the service is "to

10 (1964) 41 Pa PUC 505, 515.
lieve that there is considerable submetering by
11 The record shows many instances where
landlords without certificates ol public conlandlords and owners of large apartments and venience from the commission. • , . Oboilicc buildings purchase utility service on a viously the minority opinion [apparently of
wholesale basis and furnish such service to the commission] and appellant confuse those
their ollice and apartment tenants. Included situations where a landlord receives wholesale
:imong these arc the Presidential Apartments,
rate! and i11cl11dts tlit cost of thcst scn·icr.s
Rittenhouse Claridge, Rittenhouse Savoy (all ;,. the rent, with the obviously different situa·
in Philadelphia), and Lynncwoo<l Gardens (in tion involved in the instant appeals. Admitted:Montgomery county), the latter containing ly the Pennsylvania Utility Commission is not
1,796 anartment units,
a rent control commission and has asserted no
u In ·,ts brief, the commission says: "Ap- jurisdiction over rents." (Emphasis in orig·
pellant would have this Honorable C-Ourt be- inal.)
-00 PUR 3d
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r1r inr ~:1c ;n1iii1c.

t!·c

:L·11~111t

.\~~lJU.\

11

fTJite ch:tr~c to
La...:cd upun the an~ount

0Ycr:n(1k :-tnrl ;\;-nni111ink on the
i:-; oi tlic .;,.__::,·.1c11cc of r1\\11Cr-..liip of
the c•:uip11:c:it i11""hcd. In :i1c Yicw
oi tl;osc jud.~c5, the c~~-~cs :1rc d!~ti11g111,hai>ic on the thco1·y th:it :ip:trtmcnt owners or landowners initialh·
owned the equipment in Overlook and
J\ronimink, while in the pre>cnt c:tse
the equipment, from the time oi inst:illation to the :tpplication for tr:tn.>icr,
h:i; lieen "'med liy p11l>lic utilitic,; subject to commission jurisdiction.
li;l .....

'.\ ''ll'il '1:c r:nt1c•:l:tr tenant J.ctually
I J.S [lropu<cd in this lpplic:ition)
,, ::1r 111<•rc c11uitalilc to the tcn:int th:rn
: 1n11osing
:i hidden and unidentified
:1c:11 in the rental charge without any
,f:owing by the bndlord of the basis
'" .,..i1·ch the urility charge is calcu:.1:cd. " 13
E1·cn ~he members of the superior
criurt who voted to uphold the commi"inn' s order stated "that the
distinction made Gy the commission Getll'ccn inclnclin; the cost of utility serv:ce in a ibt rental charge :ind sulin•etcring is a distinction without a
difference :rnd the question in this ap11cal docs not turn on that fact.""
These judges also said with respect
'.o sit11J.tions where the charge is inclndcd in the rent: "\\'c :ire not so
naive as to be! ieve that the cost of
utilities are supplied free to the ten:ints; nor so naive as to bel!eve that
tile landlord does not make a profit
under such circumstances."u
'H;

Ti1c detcrmin:ttion of whether :tppcll:111t would J,c serving the jl!llilic
:titer the tr:insfers are completed is
unrelated to tlic idcntitv n[ tl1c tr:tn.;feror of the designated ;ssets or to the
fact that the equipment pre,·iou,;!y h:td
"been dcdic:ttccl to a public use :111d
impressed with a public intcrest." 16
The Cf]Uij'lllC,1t ros:;esses no :n:·stic:tl
q11:tlitics or ch:ir:tcteri,;tics -,,·Jiich render the service ior which it is utilized
a pu\Jlic service irrespccti\'e of the private or public nature of the scn·iccs
or the <lcfinite (tenants) or indefinite
(public) idcntilic:ttion of the persons
served.
The determination as to
whether appcll:int woul<l be engaged
in a public utility serYice cannot be
predicated upon whether it originally

However, we cannot agree with the
view, expressed by the three affirming
judges of the superior court, that the
present case may be distinguished from
l:J From the dissentin~ opinion of the com~
mission chairman. 41 Pa PUC at p. jl 9.
U ( 1965) 206 Pa Super Ct at 135, 212 .\2d
229, 233.
Thus, in this reg:lrd, the eommission dissenterg and both the three aflirminir and two
of the dissenting judges of the sllpcrior court
were in 3greement
'' 206 Pa Super Ct at p. 135, 212 A2d at p.

233.
A significant decision, not discussed by the
majority of the commission in the present c:ise,
i• Pennsylvania Pub. l:tility Commission v
Philadelphia Electric Co. ( 1942) 23 Pa PL'C
320. In that decision the commission determined that it would not prohibit the "'metering
or resale of current by the owner of an office
building to his tenant•. For a further discu>•
sion of the =e. see footnote 20, U.fro.

l l::i , !'. l. C.

15

234.

206 Pa Sllpcr Ct at p. 136, 212 A2cl at p.
This concept, takc:t irom

raf(·-1111:/;ing

di:c1sio11s ( C.f!., City oi Pittshur.~h v P('nnsylvania Pub. Service Commi:-.sion [ 1949J 165

Pa Surer Ct 519, 528, ~2 Pl'R .:\S 5i2. 09 .\2d
W, 849, allocatur drn 165 Pa Sllpcr Ct xxv).
is here misapplied when utilized as a co11sitk•ration in dcterminini:: whether tlie ~crncc whirh
appellant c;;ccks to render to it:; tcn:lnts COll!'ti·
tutcs pul1lic service umkr the Pllblic etility
Law. Such :tpplication, ii correct, would, for
all practical purposes, always prcchtdc a transfer of utility equipment to a nonu~ility bccau!IC,
once inclll<lc<l in the rate structure of a pllhii<'
utility, that equipment woul<l be immutably
stamped with public use and interest charac-

teristics.
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i11sL~l'.cJ the necessary equipment at
the time of construction, btcr inst:illcJ
it it,cli, or '.lurck1scJ it irom a utilitv
"' h ;c!1 Ind ;ri;;in:i\ly installed it. 17 '
\\«~ \i11ld, thcrciore, that the proposcJ sen ice which appelbnt would
renJer in the present case would not
constitute it a pu\Jlic utility within the
me:imng- of § 2 of the Public l:tility
La 11 since such service would not be
furn1sheJ "to or for the public."
[2) In the alternative, the commission he-id tk1t the transfers coulJ not
\Jc :ipprovcd even if :ippelbnt wou\J
not !Jc rcnJcring- a pu\Jlie utility service
upon consummation of the proposed
t:-:111sicrs because the commission could
not "Jisregard the public interest and
ali~11don the public and the consumers

who would become afiected by the
appron\ of the ::ipplications, to uncertain but definitely less desiralJle
prospects. " 19 The members of the
superior court who voted to :iffirm the
commission agreed with its position,
stating th:it "the commission, in exercising its administrative discretion, not
only may but should deny the transfer
of patrons out from under regulation,
even where their consent h:is been obt::iincd, in circumstance< si:ch :is t:1i<;
case presents, in the public interest and
as a matter of public policy." 19
In support of this alternative holding, the commission engaged in much
specubtion :is to possib 1e evils which
would flow from consummation of the
proposed trans[er.2°
In substance,

17 The dissenting opinion
C0\1rt quite Jpt!y stated:

19 206 Pa Super Ct at p. 134, 135, .21.2 A2cl
at p. 233 .

in the superior

.. It the iacilitics here involved h;i<l hccn orl::!·
i11;l\\y ill:>t:-i1\cJ by the landlord under si11c:lc
mc~cri11~ ;rnJ wholc.:;::i.Jc rates granted to the
b::1·1urrJ b., the t1ti!it1cs, there woul<l he no
dot1lit

oi th.c validity of the tr:::i.nqction. As the

record in this case shows, such operations exist • . . in Pcnnsylvan1:i. The circumstances that the lamllord now seeks single
mc~cr and wholesale rat:s should m:ike no
<lirfcrence in the result \Vhat is le.zal in one
case rJocs not thereby become invalid in the
ot~1cr.
The s~qucncc of events should not be
con troll in;;." 206 Pa Super at p. 125, 212 A2d
at p. 235.
I! 41 Pa Pl?C at p. 512.
Presumably, the commission acted under §
202 oi the Public Utility Law. Act of May
28, 1937, PL 1053, as amen<lcd, 66 PS § 1122.
That section requires the commission's approval, evi<lenccd by a certificate of public con·
vcnicnce, prior to the transfer of assets by a
pnblic utility to any person and prior to any
~bandonmcnt of any service to patrons. The isseance of such a certilicate is based upon the
commission's determination that it is necessary
or proper for the service, accommo<lation, convenience, or safety of the public. Although
factual and legal question• have been raised
which cast do11bt on the arplicability of that
portion of § 202 wliich involves abandonment oi
service, the commission has made no specific
f1ndin('(S with respect to such questions and
our disrosition of this appeal mo.kes it unnecessary for us to express our views respecting them.

60 PUR3d

2o For cx:."1mplc. the commission 5u~g-cstctl

th:tt, without its supervision. Drcxclbrook tenants mi~l1t eventually be subj-·ct to <li.:;crimi11at1on in rates as compared to other tcn~nts
.,,,.ho arc protcctc<l by commission juris<lict10L1;
that the practice of submetcring an<l resaic
might adversely affect the revenue return of
the public utility companies involved aml cause
increases in rates to the remaining customers
of such utilities; and, in the alternative, th~t a
change in rate structure increasing wholesale
prices mi~ht make the landlor<l's utility scrv~
ice unprofitable. The commission also voiced
concern over possible inaccuracies in meters.
It is appropriate to recall .he words of the
commission in Pennsylvania Pub. Utility Commission v Philadelphia Eleccric Co. (1942)
23 Pa PUC 320, 42 PUR NS 126, when it
expressly reiused to prohibit rernetering by
a landlord:
"[W]e deem it appropriate to state that we
have consiuered the advisability of a rule
ab<olutely prohibiting remctering or resale of
current. The so-called 'practical' difficulties
envisaged by respondent as re,ulting from such
a rule do not rcq11ire detailed comment, but
it may be observed that some predictions couhl
not reasonably be expected to eventuate aml
the fulfillment of others might well produce
compcnsatin~ benelits. Also, we have no doubt
of our jurisdiction to consider the reasonableness and justness of any tariff rule and the
practice thereunder, and to take appropriate
corrective action if the rule appears unreasonable or its application unjust: Hickey v Phila·
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c:cr, the posit:on oi liL1lli tlic cn1n"' "ion m:ijnrity a:Hl t!tc alT1n11iw~
!1w·11iH:rs oi the superior c0ur~ czi.n Le
,;11c1.•l to the propnsition tliJ.t it i:;
.~;:L.:1--t
i\~c pt)licy to J.ppr1Jrc the
1r:1'1'l'-·r 'incc it would rt::110\·c fron1
r, 1!1?1~1::-i3iun supcrYision service nvw
-::i1.1ccc ~o its jurisdiction. Such rca'011i11::;- disregarus the express formulannn oi p111Jiic policy by the legislature
cn:iiodiecl in the st:itutory de:lnition of
:!•c •crrn "public utility." Tli:it provi,,,,n co11icrs jurisdiction on the corn:ni,sirrn 01t!y where the service inv11!1·cd is rendered "to or for the public." T;1c controlling consiclcr:ition is
::nt ll'hcthcr rcc:11'ation is clesirablc, but
11::ctlicr appellant is subject to re~
!::tic•n unclcr t!te Public Ctility Law.
J(!:i 11 :in,;ky v Pennsylvania Pub. Service Commission ( 1936) 123 Pa Super
Ct 3/.;, 382, 17 PC'R :\S +01, 187
.\ti 2-+S, 251. If the legislature did
11nt deem it necessary to confer jurisdic:i1m on the commission with respect
t11 tlte sen·ice proposed by appellant
(:is the commission concedccl for purposes of its alternative holding), then
t!tc absence of such jurisdiction as a
result of the consummation of the proJi(•\\

)'ll'u! ~r:cil'tc-r "'"'ilcl not ancl could 11ot
C'n1t1-:\\ c:~c ptth! 1c policy.
Funlterniorc, •:ic po<,ilile evils which tlte
cn1r~r 1 ~':· .;:i0n c:n·is:-t~ccl as o.. res.ult nf
tl1c :~li--C!~cc of its supcn·i~iun could
come to iruitinn irrespective of whether
a l::incllord ori;i11ally inst:i!ls facilities
or later purchases them from :i. public
utility, or whether the charge for service is on a metered basis or included
in a flat rcnt:il without itemiz:i(iop__
It seems 0bvious th::tt the s:ime projcct,·d evils which tlte commission rn:i.irrity rnvi,;agccl as possibilities in the
'.'re,-cJtt c:ise m::iy be equally posited
in otltcr instances :incl c:ises previously
approvecl by the commission and the
superior court. 21
\Ve hold, therefore, that the commi:<sion crrcu :is a 111~1ttcr of bw in
ltoldin~ that Drcxcll,rook :\ssoci:ites
would i>ccnrne J. ptdJ!ic utility upon
co1i:;u111Jt1:itin:i of tl1e proposcu transiers, :111<1 t!t:it the commission also
erred in alternatively holding that the
al:ow:ince of the transfers would contr::t \'cne public policy if the commission thereby lost its jurisdiction over
the service im·oh·ed.
The order is rewrsed. The record
.

<lc:phia Electric Co. (1936) 122 Pa Super Ct
213, 220, 14 PC'R ~S 349, 184 Atl 553 . .\s:<..!c
frJrn ·practic1t considerations an<l technic;;.l
olncctions to jurisdiction and procedure, our
<lcus1on not to require prohibition of rcmeter·
in~ or resale turns upon our conclusion that
tl1c record does not show such a requirement
to he necessary at this time for public pro·
1cct1on: . . . ." 23 Pa PCC at p. 322,
42 PCR ~S at p. 127.
This \angua~e of the commission is especial...
ly notable and meaningful because it was directly at odds with the opinion oi o dissenting
member of the commission. The dissenting
commissioncr contended that 'ithe prohibition
of resales of elcc:ric current involving a prolit
to landlords is a requirement that is necessary
for public protection." 23 Pa Pt:C at p. 324,
42 Pl'R NS at p. 128. The dissent also stated:
"When the Philadelphia Electric Company
sells to a landlord and the landlord resells to
1

a tcna11t at a profit to the landlord, the landlord in m~· opinion becomes a public utility 1nrl
has no ri~lit to t.:xtort J. profit for such s::ilc."
23 Pa PLC at p. 323. 42 PCR XS at p. 128.
It is sig-11if1c:rnt that. in the face oi thi$ dis·
sent: the majority of the commission hcltl oth·
cn\"1.se.
21 Sec Pcnn~ylv:mia Pub. Utilit)• Commission
v Ph1bdc•lpltia Electric Co. ( 1942) 23 Pa
PCC 320, 42 Pt:R :-15 126. .wtra, footnote 20:
:\ronimi11k Tran~p. Co. v Pennsylvania Pub.
Sen·icc C1m1rni<.,ion (19.14) Ill Pa Super Ct
414, 5 Pl'R XS 27Q, liO :\ti .175, sutra, text
at p. 177: Borough of :\mhri<lgc v Pennsylvania Puh. S~n·icc Commis~ion, 10S Pa Super
Ct 293. P1.:R193Jrl 203, 165 i\tl 47, s11tra,
text at p. 177; Overlook Develop. Co. v
Pcnn•vlvania Pub. Service Commission. 101
Pa s;1per Ct 217, Pl:Rl931E 63, affd per
curiam ( 1932) 306 Pa 43. 153 Atl 869, s11pra,
text at p. li7. See also footnote II, supra,
181
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is rcmamkcl :i.nd the commission is
directed to :ipprove the :ipplications
:incl to issue the appropriate certifiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered bycates.
the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE---------DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT--------------RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL---------------------STATEMENT OF FACTS--------------------------ARGUMENT------------------------------------POINT I.

l

1
l
2

2

APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE COURT
BELOW ERRED IN DENYING HIS PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
BECAUSE APPELLANT WAS DENIED THE
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
AT HIS TRIAL.----------------------

2

CONCLUSION-----------------------------------

8

CASES CITED
Alires v. Turner, 22 U.2d 118 (1969)--------Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687
(6th Cir., 1974)--------------------------Coles v. Payton, 398 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.
1968)-------------------------------------Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.
1945)-------------------------------------James v. Boles, 339 F.2d 431 (4th Cir.
1964)-------------------------------------Kott v. Green, 303 F.Supp. 821 (N.D.
Ohio, 1968)-------------------------------Lance v. Overdate, 244 F.2d 108 (7th
Cir. 1957)-----------------------------~--Latimer v. Cramer, 214 F.2d 926 (9th Cir.
1954)-------------------------------------Mitchell v. Stephens, 357 F.2d 129 (8th Cir.
1965)-------------------------------------Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3rd
Cir. 1970)---------------------------------

3,7

7
5

4
4
5

4
4
4
4

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
(cont.)
CASES CITE::l
(cont.)
O'Malley v. United State, 285 F.2d 733
(6th Cir. 1961)---------------------------People v. Hill, 70 Cal.2d 678, 452 P.2d 329
(1969)------------------------------------People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal.2d 460, 386 P.2d
487 (1963)--------------------------------People v. McDowell, 69 Cal.2d 787, 447 P.2d
97(1968)----------------------------------Scott v. United States, 427 F.2d 609 (D.C.
Cir. 1970)--------------------------------State v. Anderson, 287 A.2d 234 (App. Div.
]971)-------------------------------------State v. Harper, 57 Wis.2d 543, 205 N.W.
2d 1 (1973)-------------------------------State v. Fulford, 290 Minn. 236, 187 N.W.
270 (1971)--------------------------------State v. White, 5 Wash. App. 283, 487 P.2d
242 (1971)--------------------------------United States v. Gonzolez, 321 F.2d 638
(2nd Cir. 1960)----------------------------

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
4
4
4
4
5
6
5

5
4

